We study the mode of entry decision of a multinational rm with and without nancing constraints on the local rm. We nd that the local rm's nancing constraints lead to an increase in the multinational's prots from joint venture for all possible beliefs about demand, while its prots from foreign direct investment decrease if the probability of high demand is low but increase otherwise. Examples show that joint venture arises for a larger set of beliefs when the local rm is nancially constrained. The relative protability of joint venture increases as technology transfer increases, xed cost of entry increases and the multinational's cost advantage decreases. Further, optimal contract in the joint venture without nancing depends on parameter values and displays novel features, leading to a discontinuous expected prot function of the multinational. Financing considerations restore uniquenss of the contract and continuity of the prot function. In contrast, the multinational's expected prots in FDI are continuous in its belief when there is no nancing but are discontinuous with nancing, due to features of the nancial contract between the local rm and a lender.
Introduction
We study a multinational rm's choice regarding entry into a foreign market between forming a joint venture (JV) with a local rm and competing with it through foreign direct investment (FDI). While this question has been studied extensively and various theories exist on the determinants of this choice (See for example, Horstmann and Markusen (1996) would be a more formidable competitor should the multinational enter through foreign direct investment and thus, the multinational would be more likely to choose a joint venture with such a rm, and vice-versa. This could be because a nancing contract with an outsider limits the ability of the rm to undertake certain projects or may give it incentives to set dierent prices and outputs than it would without these contracts. On the other hand, nancing constraints may reduce the bargaining power of the local rm in a joint venture and thus, may lead to JV as a relatively more protable mode of entry. We examine the interplay of these factors in a static model.
Eects of nancing decisions on the outcomes of competition between rms
in a domestic context have been studied extensively in the literature (see Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) in the context of predation; Brander and Lewis (1986) in the context of the eect of debt on outputs; Jain, Jeitschko and Mirman (JJMa) (2002) in the context of entry-deterrence, and Phillips (1995) for empirical evidence of the eect of debt on industry performance, among others). However this industrial organization literature assumes that the entrant competes with the incumbent, which is the analogue of FDI in a foreign market. Thus, the main contribution of our paper is to extend this analysis to the study of multinational enterprises where the mode of entry is a decision variable 1 .
A multinational rm may enter a foreign market on its own (that is, through FDI) or form a joint venture with local rms or license its product to local rms or simply export. We examine only two modes of entry, namely, JV and FDI, for simplicity.
2 There is a substantial literature in international trade that examines the determinants and eects of this decision, in particular on technology transfer. One of the leading theories (Horstmann and Markusen, 1996) of the choice between JV and FDI is that local rms have better information about the market than the multinational 3 and it is to overcome this disadvantage, in addition to saving the entry costs, that the multinational chooses JV over FDI. The leading argument in favor of FDI is that the multinational has a technological advantage over the local rm and thus, is better o competing with it. The goal of this paper is to analyze this decision in a model that incorporates all of these elements as well as nancing considerations. We assume that the multinational rm does not face any nancing constraints whereas local rms do. The question then is whether nancing constraints of the local rm lead to more or less joint venture formation, and how this eect depends on the degree of technological transfer, the belief of the multinational about demand and xed costs of operations and entry. Throughout the paper, we assume that the degree of technological transfer is exogenously given, for convenience.
We model the joint venture as a principal-agent relationship as in Horstmann and Markusen (1996) and Dai and Lahiri (2011) , with the multinational as the principal. Our model diers from Horstmann and Markusen (1996) in that the multinational competes with the local rm when it chooses FDI. This has the eect of endogenizing reservation utilities in addition to other changes when 1 The analysis here may very well be applicable in the domestic context as well where entering rms consider acquiring incumbents or forming alliances with them. 2 Ra et al (2009) study FDI, JV and Mergers. Our notion of JV is similar to their notion of Mergers. They do not incorporate informational dierences, nor dierential costs between local and foreign rms. 3 Jain and Mirman (2001) also make this assumption and study multinational learning in a dynamic model. nancing constraints are introduced. Further, we do not assume an interior solution but rather consider all possible beliefs. We also dier from Dai and Lahiri (2011) in several signicant ways. First, they assume that the local rm's information advantage depends on its unobserved eort, whereas we assume it to be exogenously given and public information. Thus, their agency problem in JV is one of inducing the optimal eort though a compensation scheme, whereas our JV problem is to induce the dierent types of the local rm to produce optimal output. Second, they model nancial constraints as exogenously given wealth constraints whereas we allow the local rm to borrow, creating an agency game, which has a signicant eect on results.
We rst analyze the benchmark model where nancing is not an issue for the local rm. We nd that while the expected prots of the multinational under FDI are a dierentiable function of the probability of high demand, its expected prot function under JV has a point of discontinuity, and takes two dierent forms depending on parameter values. The discontinuity takes the form of a drop in the multinational's prots once the probability of high demand reaches a certain level. This result contrasts with the standard asymmetric information models where reservation utilities are assumed to be zero for all types, and is partly due to the fact that the reservation utility of the local rm is its expected prots in FDI which are higher for the high-demand type. These prots increase suciently in the probability of high demand to cause the high-type's participation constraint to fail. The two dierent forms of the prot function arise due to the fact that for some parameter values, the rst-best contract is feasible when the probability of high demand is suciently low.
The nature of the JV contract and the resulting form of the expected prot function of the multinational leads to our result that in the benchmark model, if JV does not occur when probability of high demand is low, it cannot occur when this probability is high. That is, ceteris paribus, a high probability of high demand favors FDI. This result is interesting particularly because not only, as expected, are the FDI prots of the multinational higher in this case, but also, surprisingly, its JV prots are much lower since the JV contract yields only the low-demand prots.
The mode of entry depends crucially on the degree of technological transfer and the amount of xed costs of entry and operations. Greater the technological transfer in JV, and/or greater the xed costs, more likely it is that the multinational chooses JV. The intuition is simple -a joint venture reduces competition in the market and the multinational being the principal enjoys the residual prots from the joint operation. Total prots from this operation are higher, the greater the technological spillover. Fixed costs of operations turn out not to aect the JV prots due to the endogenous reservation utility but they reduce the FDI prots, as does the entry cost. It is to be noted that, because of the discontinuity in prots, the mode of entry may not change as long as the model parameters are within a certain range.
We next incorporate nancing constraints in the model. The local rm is assumed to have to borrow from a lender in order to nance the xed costs of operations. The lender, like the multinational, does not know the state of demand and is the principal in the nancial contracting relationship 4 . The nancing constraint leads to an interesting reversal in the expected prot functions of the multinational under the two modes of entry. First, the expected prots under JV are an increasing and dierentiable function of the probability of high demand. Intuitively this is because the high-demand type's expected prots under FDI are lower due to borrowing from a lender and therefore, its participation constraint is not violated. On the other hand, the FDI solution with nancing leads to a discontinuity in the expected prot function of the multinational. This has to do with the way the loan contract inter- 4 Loan contracts have been studied extensively in the economics and nance literature. How these are modeled depends on the question of interest. Gale and Hellwig (1985) assume that revenue of the borrower, exogenously given, is random and private information unless the lender incurs a cost to inspect it ex-post. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) analyze a reporting game between lenders and borrowers without allowing for costly state verication. In these models, there are no adverse selection or moral hazard issues. In contrast, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) study credit rationing by banks when the borrower's type is its private information or the borrower can choose projects of dierent types. JJMa enrich this literature by letting rms choose outputs and/or prices, while at the same time borrowing, and incorporate adverse selection either on the demand or the cost side. We adopt this approach.
acts with duopoly competition between the local rm and the multinational.
When the probability of high demand is low, the loan contract is such that the multinational's prot is the minimum possible.
5 As this probability increases, a threshold is reached at which the lender nds it optimal not to lend to the low-demand rm, which leads to a jump in the multinational's expected prots.
6 Overall, while the JV prots increase at all beliefs, the FDI prots are lower at low probabilities of demand but higher at probabilities above a threshold.
As for the eects of nancing on the optimal mode of entry, we nd that in many scenarios, a joint venture is more likely to occur when there are nancing constraints although the precise outcome depends on the degree of technological transfer, the extent of the cost advantage that the multinational enjoys, and the size of xed costs of operation and entry. The most straightforward case is when technological transfer is perfect and xed costs are zero. Here, we nd rst of all, that a high probability of high demand no longer favors FDI. Indeed, FDI arises only if the multinational's cost advantage is high and only when the probability of high demand is moderate. That is, while FDI occurs for suciently high probabilities of demand in the absence of nancing constraints, it may not occur at all when nancing constraints are introduced.
Even when it does occur, examples show that the set of probabilities over which the multinational chooses FDI is smaller. Intuitively, JV becomes more appealing with nancing for two reasons. First, the local rm's reservation utility in JV decreases due to the nancial contract with a lender so that the multinational is able to appropriate more prots in a joint venture. In addition, the high-type participates in the joint venture even when its surplus is zero since the alternative is to obtain zero surplus from the lender. Second, up to a threshold belief, FDI becomes less attractive for the multinational 5 This result is similar to the one obtained in JJMa, in the context of entry and private inofrmation about costs, and dierent to the one in JJMb (2002). In these papers, demand is assumed to be random which implies a dierent output strategy for mimicking than when demand is deterministic. We comment on this further later. 6 This eect seems to capture the idea that nancial constraints of the rival are benecial to a rm. However, as we have explained, this eect applies only when demand is high with a suciently high probability.
at low probabilities of demand due to the way the nancial contract aects competition under FDI.
Another eect of nancing constraints is that xed costs of operations no longer have any eect on the mode of entry decision, while the xed cost of entry continues to aect FDI negatively. This has to do with reservation utilities as well. In the absence of nancing, xed costs of operations have no eect on JV prots because the negative direct eect is completely oset by the fall in reservation utility. But when nancing constraints are introduced, the reservation utility is independent of these costs. is low, and xed costs of entry and operations are low, it is possible that FDI occurs with or without nancing. This work also shows that ease of technology transfer in joint ventures not only benets the host country but also the multinational since it enjoys a higher prot. Thus, if technology transfer is a strategic decision, ndings of this paper imply that the multinational is better o choosing a high degree of it. While our model assumes one local rm, our ndings imply that if the market is oligopolistic with rms symmetric all respects except their nancial condition, the multinational is more likely to form a joint venture with a rm that is not internally funded.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present the benchmark model without nancing constraints; in Section 3, we introduce nancing constraints and in Section 4, we conclude. All diagrams are presented at the end of the paper.
The Benchmark model: No nancing
We rst consider the benchmark scenario. A multinational rm (M) considers entering a foreign market either as a stand-alone rm (FDI) or in a joint venture (JV) with a local rm (L). We assume that there is only one multinational rm and one local rm in this market for simplicity. Demand function for the good is given by p =ã − bQ, whereã is known only to the local rm. M believes thatã is eitherā (high demand) or a (low demand), with a <ā and probability of a is 1 − ρ. We similarly use upper bars and lower bars on prices and quantities to denote these variables under high demand and low demand respectively. We assume that price is observable but quantity of the other rm is not. Since the local rm knows the demand intercept, we refer to the rm as the high-demand rm or the low-demand rm. Thus, informational advantage of the local rm is captured by its knowledge of the demand function, which is a common assumption made in the industrial organization literature, to capture information asymmetry.
Let the marginal cost of production of M be given by c m . The local rm's cost disadvantage is captured by a higher marginal cost c l > c m . We also assume that there is a xed cost of F for both rms. In addition, if M enters through foreign direct investment, it must pay an additional upfront cost of G, to be interpreted as an entry cost, or a set-up cost, that the local rm does not have to pay.
FDI
Consider the case when M enters via foreign direct investment. The resulting competition environment is the standard incomplete information Cournot competition between the two rms. M maximizes,
by choosing q m . Here, we use^to denote expected values. The local rm maximizes (ã −q l − q m − c l )q l − F by choosingq l . Solutions are:
Note that the high-demand rm produces more and thus, is better o due to asymmetric information in contrast to the low-demand rm. To ensure that outputs are positive, we must have 3a−ā−4c l +2c m > 0 ⇒ā < 3a−4c l +2c m .
We assume that parameters satisfy this condition.
Expected prots of M are:
L's expected prots are:
For later use, we note that the multinational's expected prots in FDI are increasing in its belief about high demand, and increasing in its cost advantage over the local rm. Also, the local rm's expected prots in FDI are higher 7 We assume that the multinational's foreign operations and home operations are independent, for convenience. This is true for example when variable costs are linear in total output, which is what we assume, in addition to the assumption that home demand and foreign demand are independent.
when true demand is high than when it is low. However, these prots vary negatively with respect to the multinational's belief about high demand. That is, even though the local rm knows demand, it is better o if the multinational believes demand to be low rather than high. 8 
Joint venture
We model it as follows: the multinational hires the local rm as an agent to produce the product. We assume that M has all the bargaining power so that it maximizes its expected prots subject to the local rm's participation (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. Further, we assume that the cost of JV is a weighted average of the costs of M and L, the weight reecting the ease of technology transfer and denote this cost by c j .
where θ is between 0 and 1 and is exogenously given. The local rm does not produce on its own when it enters into a joint venture. Thus, formation of a joint venture implies monopoly in the market.
LetR denote the transfer from the local rm to the multinational if the observed price p is high and let R be similarly dened. Then, the multinational's problem is to choose {(p,R), (p, R)} to maximize 9 ,
subject to the standard IR and IC constraints
Thus, a joint venture involves the multinational delegating the task of production to the local rm and providing it incentives to produce optimally according to true demand. However, in doing so, it incurs a marginal cost that need not be as low as its own, depending on the ease of the technology transfer. In addition, it incurs the agency cost of inducing the local rm to produce optimally. On the other hand, it does not have to incur the entry cost entailed in FDI and it does not have to compete under asymmetric information with the local rm. This trade-o determines the optimal mode of entry.
Note that the reservation utilities of the local rm (given in Equation (2)) are its expected prots in FDI, and are dierent for the two types in contrast to the standard model, and thus, the optimal contract is not necessarily one in which the IC constraint of the`good' type and the IR constraint of the`bad' type bind. In particular, note that the reservation utility of the high type could be high enough that a binding IC constraint may not ensure that the high type is better o in the joint venture, as would be the case if reservation utilities were the same as is generally assumed in agency problems. We start with this standard case in which only the high type's IC and the low type's 10 Here Q and Q are such that the observed price is the same as needed to mimic the other type. That is,ā−bQ = a−bQ ⇒ Q = Q+ā . This is dierent from models in which the intercept is known but cost of the rm is private information. There price targeting is equivalent to quantity targeting, assuming a deterministic environment.
and,
Substituting in the objective function yields M's expected prots from JV:
Note that F and Π l f di are constants and thus, have no eect on the equilibrium output levels. We can show that the prot maximizing outputs for this problem
Thus, output of the good type is rst-best but output of the bad type is distorted above. To ensure that the markup is positive, we assume that,
We now verify the other two constraints. It is easy to see that IC of the low type is slack.
11 However, IR of the high type may not be met, for example, when ρ is close to the upper bound. This can be seen as follows: for this constraint to be met, we need, However, the left hand side decreases to zero as ρ increases to the upper bound needed for the low-demand mark-up to be zero. We can also see that as ρ falls, the inequality is easier to satisfy. This yields an upper bound on ρ, sayρ jv , below which the inequality may be met. We can also show that if (3) is met, R is positive. However, there are parameter values for which (3) may not be met at all. It is more likely to hold if technology transfer is perfect, or if a is low, other things being equal.
13 If parameters are such that (3) holds, there exists an optimal JV contract in which the high-demand local rm produces the rst-best output and enjoys a surplus while the low demand rm produces more than the rst-best output and makes prots equal to its reservation utility. The expected prots of the multinational are:
Lemma 1: There exist parameter values for which the optimal JV contract is one in which IR of the low type and IC of the high type bind, while the other constraints are slack, provided ρ ≤ρ jv < 1. Expected prots of the multinational are given by (4).
As we can see in (4), the multinational's prots in JV are lowered by having to produce at c j rather than c m as well as by the distortion in the low-demand rm's output, which measures the agency costs of the joint venture.
If parameters are such that (3) does not hold for any ρ, we can show that there exists another threshold beliefρ 2 jv such that for all ρ ≤ρ 2 jv < 1, the optimal contract is rst-best, that is,Ī R and IR bind and the incentive constraints are slack. Substituting the rst-best outputs, we can see thatĪ C 12 This is because given our assumptions on parameters, the full information duopoly prots of the local rm are positive even when demand is low. 13 For example, when a=8.5, a = 5, c j = c l = 2 and c m = 1, there is no belief for which (3) holds.
is met if and only if,
Note that if (3) is satised, (5) cannot be. Further, (5) leads to a requirement that ρ be suciently low, given other parameters. For example, (5) leads to the following condition on ρ, if there is no technology transfer (c j = c l ):
We nd that the cost dierential needs to be low relative to the low demand intercept for (5) to be met. In addition, a needs to be suciently high and technology transfer needs to be low.
Constraint IC is met if and only if,
This can be shown to hold since the largest value of the LHS is when there is no dierence between the two demand levels. But then the LHS reduces to
Another way to see this is: 3ā + 3a − 2 a = (3 − 2ρ)ā + (3 − 2(1 − ρ))a. As a increases, this term increases to 4ā, holding ρ and a constant. In terms of ρ, the LHS increases as ρ falls. In the limit, this part becomes 3ā + a < 4ā.
If (5) holds, the multinational's expected prots are,
Lemma 2: There exist parameter values for which the optimal JV contract is rst best, provided ρ ≤ρ 2 jv < 1. Expected prots of the multinational are given by (6) .
Finally, we consider the possibility when parameters are such that neither (4) nor (6) are valid. That is, given other parameters, ρ is above the relevant threshold. We nd that in this case, the optimal contract is one which sets outputs based on binding IC and IR constraints. As a result, the low type's output is rst best but the high type's output is distorted above where, the distortion is independent of ρ.
Note thatā − bQ > 0. We now checkĪ C.
Substituting output values yields equality so thatĪ C binds as well. It follows thatR = R. Finally,Ī R requires,
If (7) is met, the high-type participates in the joint venture and M's expected prots are:
Note that these prots are the same as if the multinational knew that demand is low and are the minimum level of prots that it can earn in a joint venture.
We can verify that the high-type earns a higher surplus in this scenario than when ρ <ρ jv .
We can now prove the following:
Proposition 1: The optimal JV contract depends on parameter values.
Given all parameters other than ρ, there are two possibilities: either (1) for ρ ≤ρ jv < 1, prots of the multinational under JV are given by (4) and for 1 ≥ ρ >ρ jv , by (8); or (2) for ρ ≤ρ 2 jv < 1, prots are given by (6) (5). Thus, if ρ is suciently high, (7) applies. Hence the result.
Proposition 1 characterizes all possibilities for the JV scenario. Intuitively, the rst possibility is more likely when a is not too high and technology transfer is high; whereas the second possibility is more likely when a is high and technology transfer is low, and in addition, the cost dierential is low relative to the demand intercept dierential.
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We can prove the following corollary:
Corollary 1: The expected prot of M in JV is discontinuous in ρ. Further, (i) expected prots given by (4) are increasing up to the thresholdρ jv , (ii) expected prots given by (6) are increasing up toρ 2 jv , (iii) expected prots in (8) are increasing at a smaller rate than in (4) and (6) and are lower than in (4) and (6) at the relevant threshold, but greater than these prots evaluated at ρ = 0.
Proof : Straightforward.
The discontinuity in the prot function does not occur when reservation utilities are zero because then, for ρ above a certain threshold, it is possible to extract all the surplus from the high type and not contract with the low type, whereas in our setting, the high type is better o walking away from the contract, so that the most that can be extracted is what the low type is 14 We nd that in Example 1a (see Figure 1a ) whereā = 6, a = 4, c l = 2, c m = 1 and c j = 1, Possibility 1 applies and Example 1b (see Figure 1b) , whereā = 8.5, a = 5, c l = 2, c m = 1 and c j = 2, Possibility 2 applies. We assume b to be 1 in all our examples. able to pay. This is a novel feature of the contract due to the endogeneity and magnitude of reservation utilities of the two types. In the rst possibility, the high-demand type can do better in competition with the multinational when ρ is`high' than in the joint venture contract requiring it to produce the rst-best output, where its prots are simply the surplus that decreases as ρ increases. Thus, the only way to induce the high-demand type to participate in the joint venture, when ρ is suciently high, is to oer a dierent contract that requires it to produce a higher than the rst-best output. This scenario is equivalent to the multinational believing that demand is high with probability zero. For the second possibility (which too does not arise in the case when reservation utilities are zeo for both types 15 ), for small values of ρ, and given the other parameter values consistent with this scenario, M's prots in JV are rst-best since neither type has an incentive problem. Both types are ensured their reservation utility. Once ρ reaches a threshold, the high type's incentive constraint is violated and thus, the only possibility for M is to collect prots yielded by the low-type.
We now compare prots of the multinational in the joint venture as derived above, with its prots in FDI given by (1) . Note that the JV prots in all cases are independent of F . This is because as F increases, the reservation utility of the low-demand type decreases by the same amount, leaving net prots unchanged. Now, given the discontinuity of the prot function in JV, the mode of entry preferred by M depends on whether the JV prots are given by (4), (6) or (8) . This in turn depends on the probability of high demand, given demand and cost parameters, and the degree of technology transfer. For example, if we consider values of ρ, which exceed the relevant threshold, so that prots of M in JV are given by (8), we see that JV dominates if and only if,
Thus, if the RHS is positive, 16 for JV to dominate FDI, a suciently high xed cost is needed. The RHS is the dierence between total expected prots under FDI and monopoly prots under JV when realized demand is low. We can see that the total FDI prots are increasing in ρ, whereas the monopoly prots are constant, thus, implying that the RHS is increasing in ρ. The maximum value of this RHS, when technology transfer is perfect, is positive given our assumptions. This implies that if xed costs are zero, and technology transfer is perfect, FDI dominates if ρ is suciently high. If technology transfer falls, that is, as c j increases, the RHS increases given ρ and F + G, and thus, the threshold belief falls so that FDI dominates for a larger set of beliefs. Similarly, as F + G increases, given ρ and c j , JV becomes more likely which is intuitive as a higher entry cost makes FDI less attractive and a higher F reduces FDI prots while leaving the JV prots unchanged.
When probability of high demand is small, other parameters determine whether the rst-best or the second-best outcome is applicable. In general, we can show that when technology transfer is perfect and xed costs are zero, and parameters are such that the rst-best outcome is not feasible, JV prots are higher than FDI prots for all ρ ≤ρ jv , and FDI prots are higher otherwise. Figure 1a , we assume perfect technology transfer whereas it is the opposite for Figure 1b . Also, the high demand parameter is higher relative to the low demand parameter, and this dierence in turn is higher relative to the cost dierential, in Figure 1b .
We summarize our general ndings in the following proposition. . In Example 1a, this value is 2, which is the one assumed.
In JV, the multinational maximizes total prots subject to participation constraints of the local rm. Thus, outputs are set to be rst-best, yielding the multinational the following prots:
Expected prots under FDI are: 
Mode of Entry with Financing Constraints
We assume that the local rm is not able to fund F itself while the multinational is unconstrained. It therefore either borrows from a bank, if there is FDI, or from the multinational if there is a joint venture. Since the multinational must cover the xed cost even when there is no nancing constraint, and it is nancially unconstrained, it is optimal for it to provide nancing to the local rm in a joint venture. This becomes clearer when we set up the contracting problem in JV. We rst study FDI with nancing.
FDI
In this case, the multinational's problem remains the same but the local rm is now a borrower and thus, faces a lender who writes a contract specifying what outputs need to be produced. This contracting problem is similar to the JV contract without nancing, except that the cost is c l and the contractible output is only the local rm's output, not the total output and therefore, the multinational's output enters the maximization problem separately. This analysis is similar to that in JJMa (2002) in the context of entry. We assume that beliefs of the lender are the same as that of the multinational.
For convenience, we continue to useR to denote the transfer from the local rm to the bank if the observed price is high and let R be similarly dened. Then, the bank's problem is to choose (p,R), (p, R) to maximize,
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ρR + (1 − ρ)R − F, subject to the standard IR and IC constraints (here q and q are such that the 18 The contracting problem is similar to the JV contract in set-up because the underlying environment is the same. As Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out, their model of credit rationing can be used to study agency problems in labor market or regulation. The same logic applies here. Demand can be high or low and the local rm is informed while the multinational and the lender are not. While it is possible that these uninformed agents have dierent beliefs, we abstract from that to simplify the problem. Also, it is possible that the joint venture operates in a dierent way where both rms produce jointly and split prots according to a dierent rule. We follow the approach of Horstmann and Markusen (1996) in setting it up as an agency problem. In the JV contract, R represents a transfer to the multinational from the local rm, contingent on price, while in the loan contract, R denotes repayment to the lender in exchange for the loan. When the observed price is low, the lender and the multinational deduce that demand is low and specify the transfer/repayment to be the entire net prot. As we will see later, when the observed price is high, the stipulated transfer to the principal is higher but less than the net prot. This repayment divided by the loan F can be viewed as the interest rate.
observed price is the same as needed to mimic the other type.)
We can see several dierences between the contractual problem between the multinational rm and the local rm in a JV, and between the bank and the local rm for nancing. One dierence is that the multinational is indirectly aected by the nancing contract as outputs of the local rm are being specied in the contract. This is similar to results in the existing literature such as Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) where the nancial contract aects the product market structure. Another is that the bank has to ensure only that the local rm gets a non-negative prot in the contract since the outside option for the rm is to not produce. This captures our assumption that the local rm is nancially constrained. It borrows because of lack of internal funds.
19
This contracting problem is standard, with zero reservation utilities for both types. Thus, there is a unique optimal contract as long as ρ is below a threshold. In equilibrium, IR of the low type and IC of the high type bind.
The equilibrium outputs are: 19 We are not analyzing the eect of debt-equity mix of the local rm on the multinational's mode of entry decision. Our focus is on the mode of entry decision given that the rm has no internal funds and has no access to external equity. It would be an interesting extension to study the optimal capital structure of the local rm given that a multinational chooses how to enter the market.
One interesting result due to constant marginal costs and linear demand is that the multinational's output in equilibrium equals output it would produce in the low-demand market 20 . To ensure that the mark-up is positive, we require that
. Let the resulting upper bound on ρ be denoted by ρ f di . Thus, the optimal contract above applies as long as ρ < ρ f di .
Note that the high-demand type no longer produces the rst best output and the distortion in the low-demand output is the same as in the JV contract without nancing. Indeed, the local rm produces higher than the rst best amount in both states of demand, implying that the multinational's output is lower than the rst best. In fact, the multinational's optimal response is to produce the rst best amount assuming low demand. This is the lowest output the multinational is expected to produce in a Cournot duopoly and thus, its prots are the lowest possible. This result shows that nancing problems of the competitor need not benet the rival. Indeed, due to the strategic environment, the multinational is worse o by the fact that the rival's outputs are dictated by a third uninformed party.
However, if ρ exceeds ρ f di , the multinational's prots increase because the bank lends only to the high-demand type so that it does not need to oer any incentives and thus, is able to extract all the surplus from the rm. As a result, the equilibrium output specied is rst best. This change in the contract reveals the state of demand to the multinational. Further, the multinational becomes a monopolist when demand is low, and it produces the rst best duopoly output when demand is high. Both of these prots are higher than prots under asymmetric information, which is the case without nancing.
Thus, the multinational's prots under FDI are,
Note that when (10) applies, the local rm receives zero, regardless of demand.
It does not get a loan when demand is low and it gets zero surplus when demand is high. When (9) applies, the local rm receives zero if demand is low and a positive surplus (determined from the binding IC constraint). This surplus
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate these prots for parameter values considered in Examples 1a and 1b respectively. We summarize the ndings discussed thus far, in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3: The multinational rm's expected prots in FDI when the local rm borrows, are discontinuous at ρ f di . Further, these prots are lower than without nancing constraints, for ρ < ρ f di , and higher otherwise, becoming equal at ρ = 1.
Thus, when the local rm is able to borrow regardless of its type, that is, the state of demand, the multinational is worse o in FDI. This occurs when the belief about high demand is low. Otherwise, the multinational benets from the local rm's nancing constraints. To some extent, this captures the intuition that nancing constraints make the local rm a less formidable competitor. However, this is the case only when the lender lends only to the high demand rm thus, removing the information asymmetry between the local rm and the multinational.
21 Further, we will see below that nancing constraints also increase prots in the joint venture. Therefore, the overall 21 We are assuming that the nancial contract is observed by the multinational.
eect of nancing constraints on the mode of entry needs to be examined further.
JV
We now consider the case when the multinational oers to form a joint venture with the local rm and in the process provides nancing. It turns out that the contracting problem does not change except for reservation utilities of the local rm. In particular, providing nancing does not reduce the multinational's prots any further since even without nancing constraints, it must ensure that F is covered. When the multinational provides nancing, F appears as a deduction in the objective function but does not appear in the IR constraints, thus, changing nothing.
22
The reservation utilities that the multinational must guarantee to the local rm are now lower. The low-demand rm gets 0 in the outside option whereas the high-demand rm gets a positive surplus, if ρ is not too high, otherwise zero. Thus, using the same notation as in the JV contract without nancing, the maximization problem of M changes to choosing (p,R), (p, R) to maximize,
subject to the standard IR and IC constraints (here Q and Q are such that the observed price is the same as needed to mimic the other type.)
22 Financing the local rm imposes no additional burden on the multinational since in the JV relationship, the project essentially becomes the multinational's and regardless of nancing, the multinational must cover the costs.
Assuming that IR for the low type and IC for the high type bind and solving, we nd that equilibrium outputs are the same as without nancing. Let the upper bound on ρ needed to ensure JV with both types, be denoted by ρ jv = a−c j a−c j .
The incentive constraint of the low type can be veried. Further, we can verify that IR for the high type is satised as well: the inequality reduces to,
Thus, the optimal JV contract with nancing constraints follows the standard analysis, in contrast to the JV solution without nancing constraints, where we nd that the high-demand type walks away from the JV contract if ρ is suciently high. This is a signicant eect of incorporating nancing constraints in the model since the optimal contracting problem has a unique solution, regardless of parameter values. Intuitively, the outside option of the local rm is better without nancing. Further, the surplus oered to the hightype in JV is higher than the surplus available to it from the lender. The surplus is simply the markup times the extra output the high type produces, which is the same in FDI and in JV. The markup on the other hand is lower in FDI because of competition and higher cost.
Expected prots of the multinational in JV with nancing constraints are:
Note that prots in (11) are the same as in (4) We now examine the mode of entry with nancing constraints. It is straightforward to show that if technology transfer is perfect, JV prots of the multinational are higher than prots under FDI, even when G is zero, for all ρ < ρ f di . 23 The same is true at ρ = 1 and thus, by continuity, for a range of beliefs below 1. As for other values of ρ, rst, we can show that ρ f di < ρ jv , and for values of ρ between these two thresholds, prots in FDI are given by (10) which are higher than in (9), whereas prots in JV continue to be given by (11) . Figure 2a , which assumes perfect technology transfer, shows that 23 Prots in (11) are higher than the FDI prots at ρ equal to zero, since c l is bounded above. As ρ increases, the FDI prots remain constant while the JV prots increase. Although JV prots increase, and at an increasing rate, when the local rm is nancially constrained, it is possible that the increase is not sucient to make JV optimal for any beliefs. This requires that the technology transfer not be perfect. In this case, if xed costs are zero, FDI may occur for all beliefs, with and without nancing. This is shown in Figure 3 which is based on the same example as in Figure 2a , except that the technology transfer is changed to zero. (iv)
Increase in F has no eect on the mode of entry whereas increase in G makes JV more protable relative to FDI.
A high cost-dierential favors FDI since the multinational can make more profits when the rival has high marginal cost. However, our examples show that if technological transfer is perfect, nancing constraints lead to JV dominating for a larger set of beliefs. Another eect of nancing constraints when technology transfer is high is that JV occurs not only when demand is likely to be low but also when it is likely to be high. 
Conclusion
We nd that nancing constraints of the local rm have a signicant effect on the mode of entry decision of the multinational. The optimal contract in the joint venture is signicantly dierent, particularly in the high demand state, when the local rm is nancially constrained. The FDI prots also change in a way that lends only partial support to the argument that nancial constraints of the local rm favor FDI. Overall, nancing constraints make JV more appealing for the multinational rather than less -JV becomes more attractive when demand is likely to be low, since reservation utilities decrease for both types. Indeed, as a result, the high-demand type continues to partic-ipate in the JV even when it earns zero surplus. Further, FDI becomes worse for the multinational because of the third party involvement when the belief about high demand is low. Although FDI prots of the multinational increase beyond a certain threshold belief, we nd examples, where the overall set of beliefs over which JV occurs with nancing is larger than without nancing.
We also derive implications of technology transfer, xed costs and beliefs about demand on the mode of entry with and without nancing.
Figures
In all diagrams below, the black curves represent pro…ts of the multinational under JV and the solid red line pro…ts under FDI, both without …nancing.
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